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Stuart Kauffman argues that Darwinian natural selection cannot account for the spontane-
ous order ofself-organized systems. This paper lo(>Ls in detail at two ofKauffman s claims: (I
)
that life is an emergent property of autocatalytic sets of chemicals; and (2) that the ontogenetic
development of living organisms is an emergent property of complex networks of genes. The
author suggests that there are parallels between Kauffman's ideas about " emergent properties"
and Bernard Lonergan 's notion of "emergent probability." He then briefly explores the different
ways in which their work on the emergence of order in the universe raises religious cpiestions.
What might a Roman Cathohc theologian
and a theoretical biologist have in common?
While at first glance there would seem to be
little of substantive interest connecting the
work of Bernard Lonergan and Stuart
Kauffman, I want to argue that there are strong
affinities between their projects. Exploring
these affinities will mean looking in some
detail at their understanding of the sources of
order in the universe. From the problem of
the origin of life to the moiphogenesis of de-
veloping organisms, Kauffman finds this or-
der emerging in ways that challenge the gradu-
alism of Darwinian natural selection.
Lonergan's work on the worldview of mod-
ern empirical science, which he terms "emer-
gent probability," converges in surprising
ways with Kauffman's work. To understand
this convergence, one must first examine these
thinkers in the context of their respective en-
terprises.
Bernard Lonergan ( 1 904- 1 984) was a Je-
suit philosopher and theologian whose pro-
fessional career was spent teaching theology
in Roman Catholic universities. Since the
Second Vatican Council, there has been a
widespread collapse of the neoscholastic
paradigm for theological studies that had
been dominant within Roman Catholic
circles. Yet Lonergan had already become
aware of the untenability of this paradigm
several decades before Vatican II. He located
the root of the difficulty in the inability of
neoscholastic theology to deal with the meth-
ods of both the natural sciences and the criti-
cal historical sciences, and he made his life's
work the search for a theological methodol-
ogy that could integrate these methods.
While Method in Theology (1972) remains
Lt)nergan's mature articulation of such a
theological methodology, it is in large mea-
sure dependent on the foundation laid in his
earlier work. Insight: A Study of Human
Understanding { 1957).
Lonergan intended Insight to be "an ex-
ploration of methods generally in preparation
for a study of the method of theology." '
Lonergan "s fundamental strategy in this ear-
lier work is to understand method—not just
theological method, but all determinate meth-
ods, whether theological, historical, or scien-
tific—as rooted in a set of invariant structures
operative within the human subject. Thus, as
part of his overall argument in Insight,
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Lonergan includes on the one hand an analy-
sis of the operations which the scientist per-
forms as a scientist—in other words, an ac-
count of scientific knowing—and on the other
hand an explicit articulation of the worldview
implied by this same account of scientific
knowing. Lonergan 's tenn for this worldview
is "emergent probability." As I hope to show,
aspects of Lonergan's notion of emergent
probability—in particular his understanding
of"schemes of recurrence," development, and
finality—provide a point of contact with the
work of Kauffman.
Stuart Kauffman is a recipient of the pres-
tigious MacArthur Fellowship ( 1987-92), and
is one of the founding members in 1984 of
the Santa Fe Institute, a scientific research
center devoted to the interdisciplinary study
of the dynamics of complex phenomena. Here
I will focus on his work as he presents it in
his book. At Home in the Universe: The
Search for Laws of Self-Organization and
Complexity (1995), a somewhat popularized
version of his earlier book. The Origins of
Order (1993).
Kauffman is a theoretical, rather than an
experimental, biologist. A tremendously cre-
ative thinker, he spends most of his time
speculating on large-scale questions about
such things as the origins of life, the structure
of living organisms, and the behavior of com-
plex systems from cells to global economies.
As with many of the scientists engaged in
study of the problems of complex dynamical
systems, he exploits the power of the com-
puter and the mathematical models and ex-
plorations that it makes possible; his "experi-
ments" tend to be "in silico'' rather than ///
vitro. He is primarily concerned, then, with
asking questions, pursuing promising lines of
inquiry, and hazarding provocative and tan-
talizing answers to the questions that he raises.
The work of experimental verification he
leaves for others. As such, he fills one im-
portant role within the ecology of scientific
research. He is engaged in what philosophers
of science would call the ailiculation of a para-
digm- or the fonnulation of a scientific re-
search programme.^
What is the new paradigm or research
progrannne that Kauffman proposes? The
leitmotif that runs through his work is the
notion of spontaneous order in nature—"or-
der for free" as he puts it repeatedly.^ He is
convinced that Darwinian natural selection in
and of itself cannot account for the order ob-
served in the universe. He proposes the fol-
lowing:
[M]uch of the order in organisms may
not be the result of selection at all, but
of the spontaneous order of self-
organized systems.''
He argues that much of the order within
the universe is not the accidental outcome of
chance processes, but emerges spontaneously,
naturally, in ways that are only beginning to
be understood. According to Kauffman, Dar-
winian natural selection is not wrong, but it is
insufficient for understanding these sources
of spontaneous self-organization. Yet a revi-
sion of the Darwinian worldview needs a con-
ceptual framework that can embrace both se-
lection and self-organization, in which bio-
logical evolution can be understood as both a
"deeply historical process" and yet "lawlike
at the same time."*' So Kauffman sees his
project as a search for such a conceptual
framework. He proceeds by trying to iden-
tify "generic emergent properties" in which
the whole of a complex system exhibits prop-
erties not possessed by any of its parts.^
Kauffman proposes to explore these "ge-
neric emergent properties" using three differ-
ent examples. First, he takes up "the origin
of life as a collective emergent property of
complex systems of chemicals." Secondly,
he investigates "the development of the fer-
tilized egg into the adult as an emergent prop-
erty of complex networks of genes control-
ling one another's activities." Finally, he ex-
plores the emergent properties of "the behav-
ior of coevolving species in ecosystems that
generates small and large avalanches of ex-
tinction and speciation."** The origin of life,
the ontogeny of the organism, and the coevo-
lution of linked populations: each exhibits
emergent properties that Kauffman believes
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may point us toward laws of self-organiza-
tion.
Autocatalytic sets as schemes of
recurrence
As I alluded to above, one of the key as-
pects in Lonergan's notion of emergent prob-
ability is that of a "scheme of recurrence."
What relevance this has to Kauffman's
project will perhaps become clear in turning
/ want to shift attention to the similar-
ity between Kauffman^s notion of col-
lectively autocatalytic sets and what
Lonergan calls schemes of recurrence.
to the first issue that Kauffman takes up: his
understanding of the origin of life as a collec-
tive emergent property of complex systems of
chemicals. The central idea here is what
Kauffman calls an "autocatalytic set." "^ He
introduces the idea of an autocatalytic set as a
way of answering«(he question of how it is that
life emerges from non-life. But first he pre-
sents a thumbnail sketch'" of the history of at-
tempts to explain the emergence of life:
Alexander Oparin's discovery that
coascervates could provide high concentrations
of simple organic molecules; Stanley Miller's
demonstration that many of the fundamental
building blocks of proteins could be synthe-
sized abiogenically; Crick and Watson's dis-
covery of the double-helix structure of DNA,
and the subsequent discovery of the complex
machinery of protein enzymes which mediates
the work of DNA; finally, the idea that life
could have begun in much the same way that
nude RNA functions, without DNA or its me-
diating structure of protein enzymes. The gen-
eral picture painted by these efforts is in ac-
cord with the assumptions of Darwinian gradu-
alism: a slow accumulation of chance occur-
rences that eventually results in living organ-
isms. In other words, life emerged simple and
became complex.
Kauffman has a radically different vision
from these previous attempts to explain the
origin of life. He argues that life emerged
complex and whole, and has remained so ever
since. The linchpin for his argument is the
idea that life emerges as a consequence of
the catalytic closure characteristic of auto-
catalytic sets. The basic idea of an autocata-
lytic set is fairly easy to grasp. First of all,
"autocatalytic" simply means self-catalyzing.
Molecules are created through chemical re-
actions. These chemical
reactions are capable of be-
ing catalyzed, or sped up, by
other molecules. If the set
of molecules formed
through such catalyzed
chemical reactions are
themselves capable of cata-
lyzing the very set of reac-
tions that formed them, then the collection
of such self-catalyzing molecular chemical
reactions can be temied an autocatalytic set.
Kauffman writes:
At its heart, a living organism is a
system of chemicals that has the
capacity to catalyze its own reproduc-
tion. Catalysts such as enzymes speed
up chemical reactions that might
otherwise occur, but only extremely
slowly. What I call a collectively
autocatalytic system is one in which the
molecules speed up the very reactions
by which they themselves are fomicd:
A makes B; B makes C; C makes A
again."
Cells, for instance, are autocatalytic sets, be-
cause
except for "food molecules," every
molecular species of which a cell is
constructed is created by catalysis of
reactions, and the catalysis is itself
carried out by catalysts created by the
cell.'^
The cell, however, is an enormously complex
network of chemical reactions among roughly
100,000 different kinds of molecules. It thus
seems unlikely that such a vast network of
autocatalytic chemical reactions could emerge
spontaneously. What Kauffman labors to
demonstrate is the possibility that an autocata-
lytic set could emerge spontaneously given
sufficiently high numbers of chemicals in suf-
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ficiently high concentrations. His argument
depends on precisely establishing the condi-
tions for the emergence of such autocatalytic
molecular systems, and then asking whether
such conditions can indeed be fulfilled.
Furthermore, Kauffman has to show that
such systems (which so far lack DNA) are
capable of reproduction, and that such repro-
ducing entities are capable of Darwinian evo-
lution through natural selection. These argu-
ments take up the bulk of chapters two tlirough
four. In the end, Kauffman thinks he has made
a good case for the plausibility of such a theo-
retical model of the origins of life. As I men-
tioned above, the further work of scientific
experimentation and verification remains to
be done. Autocatalytic sets may or may not
be the final solution to the mystery of the ori-
gin of living systems from nonliving collec-
tions of chemicals, but they are certainly an
intriguing possibility. The point I want to
make does not have to do with the likelihood
of whether or not Kauffman is right. Instead,
I want to shift attention to the similarity be-
tween Kauffman's notion of collectively au-
tocatalytic sets and what Lonergan calls
schemes of recurrence.
The heart of this comparison is the notion
of reflexivity. Autocatalytic sets are reflex-
ive because they are able to catalyze the very
reactions that produce the catalysts in the first
place: "A makes B; B makes C; C makes A
again." But this reflexivity underlies
Lonergan's notion of a scheme of recurrence
as well. Lonergan's notion of a scheme of
recurrence is that of a series of events which
are ( 1 ) conditioned, and for which (2) the con-
ditions link up to form a closed circuit.
Lonergan writes:
The notion of the scheme of recurrence
arose when it was noted that the
diverging series of positive conditions
for an event might coil around in a
circle. In that case, a scries of events A,
B, C,... would be so related that the
fulfillment of the conditions lor each
would be the occurrence of the others.
Schematically, then, the scheme might
be represented by the series of
conditionals: If A occurs, B will occur:
if B occurs, C will occur: if C occurs.
. . .A will recur. Such a circular
arrangement may involve any number
of temis, the possibility of alternative
routes, and in general any degree of
complexity.'^
As Kenneth Melchin suggests.
The basic insight at the center of
Lonergan's notion of the recurrence
scheme is that of retlexivity.'^
Kauffman's description of autocatalytic sets
and Lonergan's notion of schemes of recur-
rence are clearly congruent with one another.
But while this reflexivity provides a point
of comparison, there is also a point of differ-
ence. Kauffman's autocatalytic set stands as
a particular instance of Lonergan's more gen-
eral notion. Lonergan suggests several ex-
amples of schemes of recurrence:
In illustration of schemes of recurrence
the reader may think of the planetary
system, of the circulation of water over
the surface of the earth, of the nitrogen
cycle familiar to biologists, of the
routines of animal life, of the repetitive
economic rhythms of production and
exchange.'^
A scheme of recurrence is thus a highly gen-
eralized or generic notion, capable of the wid-
est application.
This difference between particular in-
stance and generalized notion is rooted in the
difference between Kauffman's and
Lonergan's respective projects. In order to
deepen my comparison of Kauffman and
Lonergan, I would like to try and sketch the
broader context for both autocatalytic sets and
schemes of recurrence. The two notions are
answers to two different kinds of questions.
Kauffman is asking the question: what is the
way in which life emerged from non-life? He
introduces autocatalytic sets as a plausible
answer to this question. In short, he is seek-
ing determinate knowledge about the world
(even if he presupposes a division of scien-
tific labor by leaving the process of verifica-
tion to others).
Lonergan, on the other hand, is asking a
different question. He wants to understand
both the scientist's knowing, as well as the
structure of the scientifically known.
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Lonergan's question thus has two sides to it:
{ 1 ) what does a scientist do when he or she
knows something scientifically? and (2) what
is the general structure of the world, not as it
is known through any detemiinate results of
scientific investigation, but as it is known heu-
ristically through the structures of scientific
knowing?
What does this mean? Lonergan's analysis
of scientific knowing focuses on the cognitional
activities of the scientific knower. What he dis-
covers is that scientific inquiry is rooted in what
he calls "the unrestricted desire to know," the
human capacity to wonder, to ask questions
about anything and everything. But questions
are one thing; answers are another. Modern
empirical science has developed powerful meth-
ods—Lonergan calls them heuristic stnictures
—
for guiding this process of asking and answer-
ing questions. Heuristic structures are ways of
moving from the unknown to the known. Just
as in algebra, one names the unknown "x" in
order to name its properties, to combine those
properties in equations, and finally to solve the
Lonergan^s analysis of scientific knowing
focuses on the cognitional activities of the
scientific knower. What he discovers is
that scientific inquiry is rooted in what he
calls ^Hhe unrestricted desire to know,*^ the
human capacity to wonder.
equations for a specific values of "x", so mod-
ern empirical science has developed heuristic
structures for naming the unknown.
Lonergan focuses on two of these struc-
tures in particular, which he terms classical
and statistical heuristic structures. Both clas-
sical and statistical investigations seek to un-
derstand the "immanent intelligibility" of the
universe, but they do so in different ways.
Classical investigations seek insight into sys-
tematic processes tlirough "the correlation of
measurements by means of mathematical
functions." "' These insights are generally
expressed as physical laws. This is the sort
of heuristic structure employed by Galileo in
his law of falling bodies (d = I/2 Gt-) or by
Maxwell in his laws of electromagnetism. The
work of statistical investigators, on the other
hand, may be understood in the following
terms:
[Sjtatisticai invesligalions provide a
scientific account of nonsystematic
processes by searching for the prob-
abilities with which events occur, while
abstracting from the random differences
from those probabilities.'^
Lonergan has in mind here 19th-century de-
velopments in thermodynamics and the ki-
netic theory of gases, and 20th-century de-
velopments in quantum theory. These two
types of investigation and their resultant in-
telligibilities are complementary:
[C]lassical laws tell what would happen
if conditions were fulfilled; statistical
laws tell how often conditions are
fulfilled.'^
Lonergan's notion of a scheme of recurrence
enters in here as a way of linking classical
y and statistical intelli-
gibility into a unified
whole. The key points
are as follows:
( 1
)
events occur;
(2) these events
have probabilities of
occurring;
(3) some events
are systematically
linked to others by
classical laws;
(4) in certain cases events with their re-
spective probabilities can be linked in cycles,
or schemes of recurrence, by virtue of their
systematic, classical connections;
(5) these schemes of recurrence them-
.selves have probabilities of occurring;
(6) both events and schemes of recurrence
have conditions; and
(7) some schemes of recurrence function
as the conditions for other schemes.
This linkage of classical and statistical intel-
ligibility through the notion of schemes of re-
currence results in the powerful explanatory
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structure which Lonergan temis "emergent
probabiUty":
h results from the combination of the
conditioned series of schemes with their
respective probabilities of emergence and
survival. While by itself it is extremely
jejune, it possesses rather remarkable
potentialities of explanation.'"
For Lonergan, the universe is fundamen-
tally characterized by emergent probability.
The universe unfolds through the myriad
interlinking of physical,
chemical, biological and
psychic schemes of re-
currence. Furthermore,
emergent probability is
no less operative in hu-
man history than it is in
the natural world, hi es-
sence, much of the lat-
ter half of Insight con-
sists of Lonergan 's at-
teinpts to explore the significance of emer-
gent probability for human history, including
the huiuan good. Emergent probability is
clearly a key idea for Lonergan. What I want
to suggest here is that just as Kauffman's no-
tion of an autocatalytic set invites compari-
son with Lonergan 's notion of a scheme of
recurrence, so Kauffman's use of emergence
invites comparison with emergent probabil-
ity. As I pointed out above, Kauffman be-
lieves that the origin of life, the ontogeny of
the organism, and the coevolution of linked
populations all exhibit einergent propeilies.
Reductionism, holism, and emer-
gent probability
A recurring theme in Kauffman's book is
the notion of emergence, a theme that refers
to the relationship between the parts and the
whole. One of his central intuitions is that
reductionism is not ultimately an adequate
strategy for understanding the biological
world:
The reductionist program has been
spectacularly successful, and will
continue to be so. But it has often left a
vacuum: How do we use the informa-
tion gleaned about the parts to build up
a theory of the whole? The deep
difficulty here lies in the fact that the
complex whole may exhibit properties
that are not readily explained by
understanding the parts. The complex
whole, in a completely nonmystical
sense, can often exhibit collective
properties, 'emergent" features that are
lawful in their own right.-"
Darwinian natural selection is a reduction-
istic attempt to account for biological order.
In Kauffman's estimation, it is, therefore, ul-
tiinately insufficient and needs to be comple-
Jiist as Kauffman*s notion ofan auto-
catalytic set invites comparison with
Lonergan^s notion ofa scheme of recur-
rence, so Kauffman^s use of emergence
invites comparison with emergent prob-
ability.
mented by an account of the whole in bio-
logical systems. For Kauffman, the order of
self-organized systems is an emergent order.
Life "emerges" as a property of catalytic clo-
sure in chemical sets. Similarly, as I shall
point out below, ontogeny—or more precisely,
cell differentiation and morphogenesis
—
emerges as a property of genomic networks.
This idea of emergent properties is at the very
heart of Kauffman's notions of "order for free"
and laws of self-organization.
Lonergan shares with Kauffman this fun-
damental intuition about the inadequacy of re-
ductionism and the importance of emergence.
In his introduction to Insight, he says that part
of the relevance of his treatment of mathemati-
cal physics in the opening chapters is to high-
light "the significance of the transition from
the old mechanism to relativity and from the
old determinism to statistical laws."-' In
Lonergan's view, scientific developments
themselves have made a strict mechanism or
determinism untenable. Still, not all branches
of .scientific investigation or all scientists have
made this realization explicit, so part of the
function of his idea of metaphysics as "the
integral heuristic structure of proportionate
being" -- is to enable a systematic exposure
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of the limitations of mechanist and determin-
ist assumptions and to effect their reversal.
Emergent probability, then, is a way of talk-
ing about the worldview presupposed by sci-
entific investigation, but a way that avoids
mechanist or determinist assumptions.
Emergent probability gives Lonergan a
way of talking about emergence that is pre-
cise yet highly generalized. As is character-
istic of Lonergan's way of proceeding, emer-
gence takes its fundamental meaning from
cognitional theory. Here Lonergan talks about
the integration of elements of an image
through an insight:
The prototype of emergence is the
insight that arises with respect to an
appropriate image: without the insight,
the image is a coincidental manifold; by
the insight the elements of the image
become intelligibly united and related;
moreover, accumulations of insights
unify and relate ever greater and more
diversified ranges of images, and what
remains merely coincidental from a
lower viewpoint becomes systematic
from the accumulation of insights in a
higher view point.-'
While Lonergan here uses the example of
an insight or set of insights that systematize the
otherwise merely coincidental image or ranges
of images, such a notion of emergence can be
generalized to include any number of succes-
sively higher integrations. An autocatalytic set
can be understood as just such a higher inte-
gration of a lower chemical manifold. While
each and every chemical reaction is related to
its predecessors by classical laws, the intelligi-
bility of the whole recurring set goes beyond
the intelligibility of each event in the set.
Such a meaning for emergence, worked
out within the context of a basic set of terms
and relations, is lacking in Kauffnian. Emer-
gence is clearly a notion that bears a heavy
philosophical burden in Kauffman's work,
but besides his frequent remark that his un-
derstanding of emergence is "nonmystical,"
he is somewhat at a loss to explain what he
means, other than by providing examples
such as his idea that life is an emergent prop-
erty of autocatalytic sets, or that ontogeny is
an emergent property of genomic networks.
Emergence is a central notion in Insight as
well; but unlike Kauffnian. Lonergan is able
to provide an explanatt)ry account of emer-
gence, by means of which it is possible to
work out its implications for understanding
the universe. One of the implications of
emergence, for both Kauffman and
Lonergan, is that the universe is a develop-
ing universe, and so it is to Kauffman's ex-
ploration of the developing organism that I
will turn next.
Ontogeny and development
The second topic Kauffman takes up in
his investigation of generic emergent proper-
ties is the issue of ontogeny, "the development
of the fertilized egg into the adult as an emer-
gent property of complex networks of genes
controlling one another's activities." Ontog-
eny, or development, has two aspects: cell
differentiation and morphogenesis. In the cell
differentiation that takes place in a human
person, for instance, the descendants of a
single zygote cell develop into 256 different
cell types, each of which is specialized for a
certain type of function within the body.
Somewhere on the order of 10''* cells are
formed through a series of 50 cell divisions.
Morphogenesis refers to the organization and
coordination of this vast number of cells into
functioning tissues and organs. The obvious
question is. how did such a magnificently
complex and ordered process emerge?
The discovery of the gene, and later, DNA,
led to what Kauffman calls the central dogma
of developmental biology:
Cells differ because different genes are
active in the different cell types of the
organism.-^
But this leads to further questions:
What is the mechanism that allows
some genes to be active while others
are suppressed? And how, as the zygote
unfolds into the body, do the various
cell types know which proteins to
express?'^
The next important step, according to
Kauffman, was the work of Jacob and Monod
in the mid-1960s, and their idea of genetic
circuits, especially the idea that "action via
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second sites meant utter freedom from the
molecular point of view to create genetic cir-
cuits of arbitrary logic and complexity." -*'
Such a view is amenable to the Darwinian
view that natural selection is the sole source
of order. In this view, the pattern of ontogeny
that leads to a human body is simply the re-
sult of the chance accumulation and selection
of arbitrary genetic circuits.
Kauffman, as might be expected, is not
satisfied with this explanation. He does not
think it is sufficient to account for the actual
order observed within the processes of on-
togeny:
Since each of our cells houses some
10(),()()() or more genes, the state space
of the human genomic regulatory
system is at least 2"'"""" or lO^*''^"". As
we have noted, this number is meaning-
lessly enormous compared with
anything we know about, hi terms of
this vast state space, what is a cell type?
The central dogma of developmental
biology merely states that different cell
types are different patterns of activity of
the same genomic system. That is not
much help when the human genome
affords at least 10^"""" combinations of
gene activity.-'
In place of this central dogma,
Kauffman proposes that cell types are ba-
Is there a way in which the organism as a
whole operates to condition which basins of
attraction a cell might be pushed toward?
Kauffman does not address this question^
but Lonergan^s understanding of develop-
ment suggests that this might be a fruitful
line of inquiry to pursue.
sins of attraction within the genomic net-
work. The vast state space of the genomic
network was not explored in a purely ran-
dom fashion; rather, it is pulled by a rela-
tively small number of attractc^rs.-** Such
basins of attraction should be able to resist
perturbations; otherwise these cell types
would lack the requisite homeostasis. On
the other hand, this homeostasis cannot be
absolute:
If the zygote differentiates through
branching pathways to intermediate
cell types that themselves branch to the
final cell types of the newborn or the
adult, then occasionally a perturbation
will have to push a cell into a new
basin of attraction (lowing to a new
attractor—that is, into a new develop-
mental pathway flowing to a new cell
type.-"
If Kauffman is right about genomic networks
functioning as basins of attraction for cell
types, then the process of ontogeny represents
another example of "order for free."
A further question arises about the source
of these perturbations in the first place. Is
there a way in which the organism as a whole
operates to condition which basins of attrac-
tion a cell might be pushed toward?^"
Kauffman does not address this question, but
Lonergan's understanding of development
suggests that this might be a fruitful line of
inquiry to pursue. As has been shown,
Lonergan introduces emergent probability as
a way of integrating classical and statistical
methods, but emergent probability also ad-
mits of further ex-
pansions to include
both genetic method
(which allows
Lonergan to deal
with development
and change) and dia-
lectical method
(which allows him
to deal with the dis-
tortions of human
history). Genetic
'^ method deals with
development, which Lonergan defines this
way:
...a flexible, linked sequence of
dynamic and increasingly ditferentiatcd
higher integrations thai meet the tension
of successively transfomied underlying
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manifolds through successive applica-
tions of the principles of correspon-
dence and emergence.^'
Development consists of a series of higher
integrations of lower, otherwise coincidental
manifolds, but if development is to be ongo-
ing, such integrations must be dynamic. A
higher integration is static when the lower
manifold is dominated with complete success,
so that the same systematic patterns keep re-
curring without modification or change."
Lonergan's example here is of the inert gases
locking manifolds of subatomic events within
permanent routines. One could also think of
it in terms of Kauffman's absolute homeosta-
sis within cell types that would preclude fur-
ther differentiation. But according to
Lonergan, when the higher integration is dy-
namic, there results an ongoing modification
of the underlying manifold until a new inte-
gration emerges. Lonergan refers to the de-
veloping organism as an operator, because it
"so integrates the underlying manifold as to
call forth... its own replacement by a more
specific and effective integrator."^' As an op-
erator, it seems likely that an organism might
play at least a limited role in determining
which developmental pathway a cell might
follow. The developing organism is thus the
ongoing linked series of increasingly differ-
entiated integrations.
I hope I have shown that Lonergan's ex-
planatory account of emergence, along with
its implications for development, meshes
nicely with Kauffman's explorations into the
ontogeny of the organism. As was the case
with the comparison between autocatalytic
sets and schemes of recurrence, there is here,
as well, an interesting convergence between
the ideas of these two seemingly disparate
thinkers. As I mentioned above, however,
Kauffman has so far left the work of experi-
mental verification to others. It is entirely
possible, perhaps even likely, that Kauffman's
theories are wrong. The point I want to em-
phasize here is that the validity of Lonergan's
understanding of emergence and emergent
probability in no way depends upon the cor-
rectness of Kauffman's ideas. Because
Lonergan's account of emergent probability
is based on the heuristic structures of empiri-
cal science (in other words, on the concrete
perfomiance of scientists), rather than on the
detemiinate contents of particular scientific
investigations, his account does not stiuid or
fall with the eventual verification or falsifi-
cation of Kauffman's theories.
Order for free and finality
In closing, I want to consider briefly the
matter of how, for both Kauffman and
Lonergan, reflection on an evolutionary
world-order characterized by emergence
opens out onto religious questions. Written
as it is as a popularization of a body of scien-
tific work, it would be easy to overlook
Kauffman's more poetic flights in At Home
in the Universe. But while such reflections
may not offer much in the way of "hard sci-
ence," still they express on the one hand a deep
dissatisfaction with what he takes to be the
implications of Darwinian natural selection,
and on the other hand a deep-seated religious
longing for meaning. Kauffman sees nihil-
ism at the heart of Darwinian evolution:
Science has left us as unaccountably
improbable accidents against the cold,
immense backdrop of space and time.^''
Not that Kauffman is about to embrace
institutionalized religion. Traditional reli-
gious belief he considers a non-option: "Para-
dise has been lost, not to sin, but to science."
^^ For Kauffman, the rise of science means
the demise of religious belief. Yet he holds
out hope that although paradise has been lost
to science, perhaps science can still wrest from
the world a sense of the sacred:
If we are, in ways we do not yet see,
natural expressions of matter and
energy coupled together in
nonequilibrium systems, if life in its
abundance were bound to arise, not as
an incalculably improbable accident,
but as an expected rulfillment of the
natural order, then we truly are at home
in the universe. ^^
The phrases "at home in the universe" and
"we the expected" rather than "we the improb-
able" echo throughout the book, and lend
The Boston Theological Institute 187
Kauffman's search for "order for free" not a
little of its urgency.
Lonergan finished writing Insight in 1953,
the same year Watson and Crick's paper on
the double helix structure of DNA was pub-
lished. In light of this, the applicability of
Lonergan 's ideas on genetic method is noth-
ing short of astonishing. Lonergan, I have
suggested, would find much in Kauffman's
work to embrace. There is one final pjirallel
that I wish to draw, namely, that for Lonergan
no less than for Kauffman, the order of the
universe opens out onto religious questions,
albeit in significantly different ways. For what
Kauffman terms "order for free" finds its
counterpart in Lonergan's notion of finality,
an "upwardly but indeterminately directed
dynamism towards ever fuller realization of
being." ^^ But while Kauffman limits his
search for the sacred to the universe acces-
sible to the empirical sciences (what Lonergan
would refer to as the universe of proportion-
ate being), Lonergan allows for the unre-
stricted desire to know to raise the question
of transcendent being: that is, is there some-
thing that explains the explainability of the
universe of our experience? And to raise that
question is already to be engaged in a search
for God.
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